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 Abstract 
 
1) Background: This paper addresses the return of religious 
Antisemitism by a multivariate analysis of global opinion data from 28 
countries.  
2) Methods: For the lack of any available alternative we used the World 
Values Survey (WVS) Antisemitism study item: rejection of Jewish 
neighbors. It is closely correlated with the recent ADL-100 Index of 
Antisemitism for more than 100 countries. To test the combined effects of 
religion and background variables like gender, age, education, income 
and life satisfaction on Antisemitism, we applied the full range of 
multivariate analysis including promax factor analysis and multiple OLS 
regression.  
3) Results: Although religion as such still seems to be connected with the 
phenomenon of Antisemitism, intervening variables such as restrictive 
attitudes on gender and the religion-state relationship play an important 
role. Western Evangelical and Oriental Christianity, Islam, Hinduism 
and Buddhism are performing badly on this account, and there is also a 
clear global North-South divide for these phenomena. 
4) Conclusions: Challenging patriarchic gender ideologies and 
fundamentalist conceptions of the relationship between religion and 
state, which are important drivers of Antisemitism, will be an important 
task in the future. Multiculturalism must be aware of prejudice, 
patriarchy and religious fundamentalism in the global South. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This paper attempts to address the issue of the return of religious 
Antisemitism by a rigorous, quantitative analysis of the global opinion 
data of the World Values Survey (WVS). 1 It is based on interviews with 
almost 400.000 representative interview partners from all of the world’s 
major cultural zones. 
 
Ever since the pathbreaking study by Adorno et al. (1950), it was alleged 
that religion plays a major role in the rise of Antisemitism in conjunction 
with other factors. Attempting to establish the drivers of global 
Antisemitism today and whether or not religion plays a role in it, it is all 
too logical to test this hypothesis with comparable opinion survey data 
from as many countries as possible.  
 
Considering the vast literature on religion and Antisemitism (Langmuir, 
1990; furthermore, Ericksen and Heschel, 1999; Gidley and Renton, 2017; 
Laqueur, 2006; Michael, 2006; Rittner et al., 2000; Spicer, 2007), such an 
empirical research strategy seems to be most promising. Our study 
highlights the importance of including variables about gender roles in 
society and variables about the concrete understanding of the 
relationship between religion and state in future Antisemitism studies.  
 
Comparative data about global Antisemitism are scarce, with the notable 
exception of the ADL (2014) study of Antisemitism in over 100 countries. 
But the freely available ADL (2014) data do not contain systematic 
religion background variables of the thousands of interviewed global 
respondents, so a multivariate analysis about the relation between 
religion and Antisemitism must rely on other sources. In this context, the 
World Values Survey (WVS), enters the stage. Ever since the influential 
Weil study (1985) on Antisemitism in the United States, West Germany, 
Austria, and France, the use of such comparative opinion survey data in 
                                                          
1 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp. All downloads on September 11, 2018.  
the study of Antisemitism is regarded as a legitimate tool of analysis of 
the subject.  
 
The World Values Survey (WVS) was started in 1981, it consists of 
nationally representative surveys using a common questionnaire 
conducted in approximately 100 countries, which make up some 90 
percent of the world’s population. The WVS has become the largest non-
commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs 
and values ever conducted. It contains representative freely available 
anonymous individual data of the global citizenry on income, social 
position, education, religion, attitudes about life and politics, gender 
roles, trust in institutions, ethics, and prejudices et cetera. These data 
render themselves for further analyses, for example, on how trust in the 
national government across countries is correlated with income and 
education, or how the different denominations in, say, Germany or 
India, view the priorities of a democracy and how these views correlate 
with xenophobia, homophobia and racism in the country. The World 
Values Survey thus offers really endless opportunities for the social 
sciences and scientific phantasy and ingenuity has no limits.  
 
For 28 countries (Albania; Argentina; Bangladesh; Bosnia; Belarus; 
Canada; Chile; Czech Republic; India; Iran; Iraq; Japan; South Korea; 
Kyrgyzstan; Mexico; Moldova; Nigeria; Russia; Slovakia; South Africa; 
Zimbabwe; Spain; Uganda; Macedonia; Egypt; United States; Uruguay; 
and Venezuela) the World Values Survey contains an item on whether or 
not respondents reject to have a Jewish neighbor.  
 
Compared with the theoretical sophistication of previous Antisemitism 
studies today (Curtis et al., 1986; Plous, 2003; Wistrich, 2010; see also 
Bauer, 1993; Wistrich, 2004, 2007, 2010), this second-best research 
strategy might look like rather primitive, but considering the high 
nation-state level correlation between the ADL data (2014) and the WVS 
data, established in this essay, this “forensic sociology approach” seems to 
be justified, considering the quantity and quality of the other WVS data 
and its huge opportunities to properly measure religious phenomena at 
given regular intervals since the 1980s. Thus, our research strategy is 
perhaps weak on the variable to be explained but it has a powerful and 
very exhaustive array of comparative explanatory variables at its 
disposal. 
 
Thus, this article takes up the challenge to study in full the relationship 
between religion and Antisemitism at the level of global society, based 
on the mentioned second-best solution of operationalizing Antisemitism 
by the single variable of someone rejecting to have a Jewish neighbor.  
 
In our essay, we first describe the theoretical background of this study, 
and then designate the methods and data.  
 
Our results are presented at different levels. First, we analyze the extent 
of Antisemitism in world society according to countries and global 
denominations and the extent to which respondents attach importance to 
religion in their lifes. Such a research strategy far better captures the 
depths of religious feelings than religious service attendance rates or the 
strength of belief in a personalized Deity, often used in other studies 
(Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014), since asking global respondents 
about the importance they attach to religion is independent from the 
belief in a personalized Deity inherent in the Abrahamic religions of 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Röhrich, 2004, 2010). 
 
We then present the results of our multivariate factor analysis, looking at 
the effects of the importance of religion in life, the importance given to 
religious faith in education, life satisfaction, satisfaction with the 
financial situation of the household, gender, age, and received years of 
education and how these effects combine to explain Antisemitism. We 
specifically also include variables about gender roles in society and 
variables about a restrictive understanding of the relationship between 
religion and state, making the difference between an enlightened and a 
restrictive, patriarchic reading of the religious Holy Scriptures and the 
different religious traditions. 
 
We also undertook a multiple standard OLS regression analysis of the 
weight of these variables in explaining Antisemitism. In both research 
strategies, it emerges that traditionalist opinions on gender roles, 
reserving higher education for male persons, and on the religious 
fundamentalist demand that only religious believers should be elected to 
public office, are statistically highly significant in determining 
Antisemitism. These opinions are the real litmus test of an enlightened 
versus a restrictive religiosity. 
 
We further analyze this theme by looking at the partial correlations of an 
entire similar array of other World Values Survey variables with 
Antisemitism, keeping satisfaction with life and the financial situation of 
the household, gender and age constant. This analysis again highlights 
the importance of the above-mentioned pattern of interpretation. 
 
A final analysis then shows the extent of Antisemitism in different 
countries of the world, ranked by denominational groups, and based on 
the World Values Survey data. While in our 28 countries with complete 
data Protestants in Uruguay, Canada, and Argentina and Roman 
Catholic regular Sunday Mass Church attenders in Argentina, Canada 
and the United States are the major denominational communities with 
the lowest global rates of Antisemitism, Muslims in India, Iran and Iraq 
are the most antisemitic religious groupings of the world. 
 
We present some policy relevant prospects and conclusions in the final 
chapter of our work. 
 
 
Background 
 
 
We are well aware of the many past valuable attempts in the growing 
international scientific tradition of ecumenical and religious studies to 
arrive at theologically and social scientifically well-founded comparisons 
of global religions and civilizations (just to mention a few: 
Juergensmeyer, 2000, 2011, 2013, Küng, 1997, 2002, Lenoir and Tardan-
Masquelier, 1997; Lenoir, 2008, Röhrich, 2004, 2010; Sacks, 1998, 2003, 
2005, 2014).  
 
Global opinion surveys can contribute to a still better understanding of 
the realities of global religions “on the ground”. To study the Scriptures 
by comparative means and to rely on an anthropological, philosophical 
and theological interpretation does not tell us, for example, how 
different publics around the globe, brought up in different religious 
traditions, are inclined to follow or disregard the need to hold a valid 
ticket when using public transport, independent from income, education 
and gender. The systematic social scientific study of global values and 
opinions, used in this essay, answering precisely such questions, has of 
course a long and fruitful history in the social sciences (Norris and 
Inglehart, 2011; furthermore, on global value change, Aleman and 
Woods, 2015; Alexander and Welzel, 2011; Ciftci, 2010; Davidov et al.; 
2011; Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Hofstede et al.; 2010; 
Inglehart and Norris, 2010; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 2013; Schwartz, 
2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). This research tradition contributed to 
an unprecedented rise in the empirical global sociology of religions. 
 
What do we know from this type of sociology on the phenomenon of 
Antisemitism? Adorno et al. (1950) in their pathbreaking study on the 
authoritarian personality already attempted to establish the hypothesis 
that subjects with some religious affiliation are more prejudiced than 
those without affiliation, but no significant differences between 
Protestants and Catholics exist. Adorno et al. (1950) also maintained that 
there is a low but significant negative relation of intelligence and 
education to ethnocentrism. Other factors mentioned in that famous 
study are parental relations, childhood experiences, the conception of the 
self, and the dynamics and the organization of personality. Political and 
economic ideas, religious ideology and syndromes all determine the 
development of the authoritarian personality. A veritable endless 
number of studies meanwhile has researched the connections between 
Antisemitism and authoritarianism, and between Antisemitism and 
sexism (see Auestad, 2015; Young-Bruehl, 1996). This article is well 
within the tradition to study Antisemitism with the help of rigorous 
quantitative methods and applies a comparative perspective in focus (see 
the influential study by Glock and Stark, 1996 on Antisemitism in 
Canada; furthermore, Aichinger and Fine, 2017; Brym et al., 1993; Cohen, 
2018; Farnen et al., 2005; Klein and Streib, 2018; Klein et al., 2018). 
 
We start from the assumption that a macho-type of outlook on society, 
typically to be found among adherents of the opinion that University 
education is more important for a boy than for a girl, will have a 
profound effect on the general pattern of prejudice, held by an 
individual, including Antisemitism (Adams et al., 1997). In the 
theoretical social science literature, there is a large consensus that sexism 
and Antisemitism are deeply interconnected, and that sexist social 
structures enhance antisemitic tendencies (Adams et al., 2002; Eisenstein, 
2014; Guillaumin, 2002; Lutz et al., 1995; Smith, 1988; Williams, 1989). A 
very large number of empirical studies, but also government reports, 
have already highlighted this close inter-relationship (Brah, 1991; Brandt, 
2011; Inglehart, 2006; Leong and Ward, 2006; Reisigl and Wodak, 2005; 
Small, 2013; United States Congress, 2015). While in some advanced 
industrial countries, like the U.K., there is now a gender gap in tertiary 
education to the detriment of males, 2 in a large number of countries not 
only enrollment rales in tertiary education are often heavily male-biased; 
but also professed opinions on the issue consent with this large-scale 
discrimination (Chzhen and Bruckauf, 2017). To state that “A university 
education is more important for a boy than for a girl” must be regarded as the 
“locus classicus” of the discourse of gender discrimination (Reisigl and 
Wodak, 2005; Wuthnow, 2008). In fact, this variable is one of the best 
documented in the entire WVS project and is highly correlated with a 
host of other indicators (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). 
 
We also start from the assumption that the effects of denomination and 
commitment to religion on Antisemitism per se are not as important as 
the effects of a religious fundamentalist world outlook that says that 
“politicians who don´t believe in G’d are unfit for public office”. The 
importance of “religious fundamentalism”, measured here by the 
mentioned WVS item has been also stated frequently in the relevant 
literature, among others, in Hosseini and Saha, 2018; Inglehart and 
Norris, 2003; Kaufmann, 2009, 2010; Kaufmann and Goujon, 2010; 
Kaufmann and Haklai, 2008; Patterson, 2010; Skirbekk; and Tessler, 2002. 
Such an opinion is not restricted to so-called developing countries. Even 
                                                          
2 Guardian, May 12, 2016, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/may/12/university-gender-gap-
scandal-thinktank-men.  
in the United States, an influential Evangelical Republican, 2016 
Presidential Contender Senator Ted Cruz (Texas) made headlines when 
he exactly declared in 2016 that an Atheist isn’t fit to be President of the 
country. 3 
 
What is the relationship between Antisemitism, xenophobia and 
“existential security”? In view of the contemporary implosion of societal 
trust by majority populations in Western democracies in their respective 
political systems, we are also inclined to mention here as well Inglehart’s 
recent theory of “cultural evolution” (Inglehart, 2018) in the explanation of 
xenophobia, racism and Antisemitism. Inglehart argues that people's 
values and behavior are shaped by the degree to which survival is 
secure; it was precarious for most of history, which encouraged a heavy 
emphasis on group solidarity, a rejection of outsiders, and obedience to 
strong leaders. High levels of existential security encourage openness to 
change, diversity, and new ideas. The unprecedented prosperity and 
security of the postwar era brought cultural change, the environmentalist 
movement, and the spread of democracy. But, Inglehart says, in recent 
decades, diminishing job security and rising inequality have led to 
authoritarian reactions. In the perspective of Inglehart’s theory, growing 
unease with “multiculturalism” and “migration” coincides with a rising 
inequality in many countries of the Western world.4  
 
The analysis of Antisemitism can look back on more than a century of 
fruitful studies with a vast and still growing literature (Jikeli and 
Allouche-Benayoun, 2012; Kertzer, 2007; Michael, 2008; Rosenfeld, 2013; 
von Bieberstein, 1977; Wistrich, 2010; see also Bauer, 1993; Wistrich, 2004, 
2007, 2010). The ADL, 2014 study was a hallmark in previous research, 
because it opened the way for cross-national, empirical comparisons of 
the rates of Antisemitism. The overall ADL GLOBAL 100 Index Score 
(ADL, 2014) is 26 percent, that is to say at least 26% of the citizens of our 
                                                          
3 Huffington Post, Dec. 21, 2016, available at 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ted-cruz-
atheists_us_5640b613e4b0411d30719f52. On Antisemtism and Evangelical 
Christianity, see Kressel, 2007; Rausch, 1993. 
4 For most recent time series data about inequality, see University of Texas Inequality 
Project, available at https://utip.lbj.utexas.edu/data.html.  
globe – more than 1 billion people - are anti-Semitic. This reflects the 
percentage of global respondents who say that at least six of the eleven 
negative stereotypes tested in the ADL (2014) study are “probably true.” 
In the world regions, the results are as follows (weighted percentages) 
 
Middle East & North Africa (MENA): 74% 
Eastern Europe: 34% 
Western Europe: 24% 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 23% 
Asia: 22% 
Americas: 19% 
Oceania: 14% 
 
In Map 1 we summarize the results from the ADL (2014) study in a 
geographical fashion in order to estimate the strength of societal 
Antisemitism. 
 
Map 1: The ADL 100 scores of global societal Antisemitism 
 
 
 
-11,28 to 0,20
0,20 to 11,68
11,68 to 23,15
23,15 to 34,63
34,63 to 46,10
46,10 to 57,58
57,58 to 69,05
69,05 to 80,53
80,53 to 92,00
92,00 or more
 
 
Highest: Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia 
Lowest: Laos, Philippines, Sweden, Netherlands, Vietnam 
 
 
Materials and methods 
 
 
Global value studies are made possible by the availability of systematic 
and comparative opinion surveys over time under the auspices of 
leading representatives of the social science research community, 
featuring the global/and or the European populations with a fairly 
constant questionnaire for several decades now. In the case of the World 
Values Survey, the original data were made freely available to the global 
scientific publics and render themselves for systematic, multivariate 
analysis of opinion structures on the basis of the original anonymous 
interview data.5 Our data thus are from this set of reliable and regularly 
repeated global opinion surveys (see Davidov et al.; 2008; Inglehart, 2006; 
Norris and Inglehart, 2015; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014).  
 
                                                          
5 http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ 
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In the social sciences, there is a rich and evolving debate on the 
conclusions to be drawn from these comparable and freely available 
“omnibus surveys”. For a number of years now, also some leading 
economists became interested in studying global comparative opinion 
data, especially from the World Values Survey (Alesina, Algan et al., 2015; 
Alesina, Giuliano, et al., 2015). The interest of the economics profession in 
the relationship between religion and economic growth certainly was a 
factor contributing to the rise of the methodological approach, which we 
share with many other social scientists in this study (McCleary and 
Barro, 2006, Barro, 2003). Prejudice is the anti-thesis to societal trust. 
Antisemitism is thus an anti-thesis to societal trust. The majority of the 
major economic studies, using World Values Survey data concluded that 
trust is an important factor for long-run economic growth (Alesina, 
Algan et al., 2015; Alesina, Giuliano, et al., 2015; Zak and Knack, 2001). 
Trust is also an important factor in the political stability of a nation. 
Some of the countries with very high rates of Antisemitism, like Iraq, are 
also countries with extreme problems of political stability and very low 
interpersonal trust (Tausch, 2016b; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). 
 
In the present article, we feature on religiosity and Antisemitism in the 
framework of what is called in Political Science the “civic culture” of the 
respective societies where the people holding religious beliefs live 
(Almond and Verba, 2015) and the role played by religiosity in this “civic 
culture” (Inglehart, 1998; Silver and Dowley, 2000). Studies on Muslim 
religious beliefs were a growing focus of research in international social 
science since the 1990s, especially since the terror attacks of 9/11 in New 
York City. Compared to the now existing veritable flood of high quality 
survey-based studies on Muslim communities around the globe, the 
available comparable opinion-survey based evidence on other global 
denominations is still rather scarce (Tausch and Moaddel, 2009).  
 
Sociologists, working with the unique comparative and longitudinal 
opinion survey data from the World Values Survey have discovered inter 
alia that there are pretty constant and long-term patterns of change in the 
direction of secularization (Inglehart, 2006; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; 
Norris and Inglehart, 2011). Inglehart and his associates firmly believe 
that especially the ability of the Roman Catholic hierarchy to tell people 
how to live their lives is declining steadily (see also Morel, 2003).6  
 
We are well aware that our research design is only a second-best 
solution, but in view of the free availability of data we had no better 
choice.  
 
In order to be able to rely in any reasonable measure on our results, at 
least we had to look into the empirical relationship between the ADL 100 
variable and World Values Survey Antisemitism rates on a country to 
country level, in order to calibrate our estimates. For 23 countries we can 
calibrate the results accordingly and calculate a Pearson-Bravais 
correlation coefficient between the available two comparative data series 
on global Antisemitism, i.e. the WVS data on the rejection of Jewish 
neighbors, and the ADL (2014) data. The countries with complete data 
for both variables are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia, Canada, 
Chile, Czech Republic, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Korea (South), 
Mexico, Moldova, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Uganda, United 
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela, representing a fair mix of global 
religions and cultures. Indeed, the two measurement scales have 56.16% 
of the variance in common, i.e. our preferred second-best solution using 
WVS data in our study captures more than half of the variance of the far 
superior measurement scale, the ADL (2014) data series.  
 
  
                                                          
6 http://ur.umich. edu/0405/Apr11_05/11.shtml 
 Graph 1: the correlation between the WVS data on rejecting Jewish 
neighbors and the ADL (2014) rates of Antisemitism 
 
 
 
 
Note: WVS scale ranging from 0.0 (=0%) to 1.0 (=100%) 
 
Our statistical analysis of open survey data is based on one of the most 
commonly used statistical software of the world, the IBM SPSS XXIV, 
utilized at universities and research centers around the globe.7 The 
program contains the entire array of modern multivariate statistics 
(Blalock, 1972; Tabachnik and Fidell, 2001), and any researcher should be 
able to arrive at the same results as we do here when she or he uses the 
same open data and the SPSS. The chosen SPSS data-file from the WVS 
data base was called “WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014_spss_v2015_04_18. 
sav.” All details, including the mathematical algorithms used are 
available from IBM, 2011a, 2011b.  
 
Our main statistical calculations relied on cross tables, comparisons of 
means, bi-variate and partial correlation analyses, factor analysis 
(oblique factor rotations based on promax factor analysis) and standard 
multiple regressions (OLS). Can the variables under consideration here 
                                                          
7 IBM SPSS SPSS Statistics, http://www-03. ibm.com/software/products/en/spss-
statistics.  
be represented in mathematically reduced dimensions, and what 
percentages of the total reality are thus reproduced, and how are these 
dimensions related to each other? And what is the relationship of the 
underlying variables with these dimensions? Is there indeed such a 
“factor” or “dimension” as religiosity, and how does it affect 
Antisemitism? Is there, apart from it, also something like “feminism”, 
and also something like “class” or “status”, which influences 
Antisemitism, independent from the other “factors”? Promax factor 
analysis is a well-established multivariate and mathematical variety 
among the general techniques of factor analysis, which extracts the 
underlying dimensions from the matrix of correlations between the 
variables and precisely answers the questions just raised above. 8 It was 
amply described in recent literature (Finch, 2006; Tausch, Heshmati and 
Karoui, 2014, see, furthermore Gorsuch, 1983; Harman, 1976; Rummel, 
1970). Promax factor analysis is considered to be the most appropriate 
technique of factor analysis in public opinion survey studies today 
(Finch, 2006; Ciftci, 2010, 2012, 2013; Ciftci and Bernick, 2013). Factor 
analysis – in our case promax factor analysis – also allows the researcher 
to use the mathematical model for the development of a new 
measurement scale for the new dimensions, derived in the research 
process (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). In modern social 
indicators research, such new scales are called “parametric indices”. 
 
Current methodology of the social sciences makes it clear that besides 
factor analysis, there also other powerful tools of multivariate analysis 
available to test complex relationships between an independent variable 
(in our case Antisemitism) and independent variables (Blalock, 1972; 
Tabachnik and Fidell, 2001). In our case, we used standard OLS multiple 
regression analysis and partial correlation analysis. 
 
Keeping in line with standard traditions of empirical opinion survey 
research (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014), for all analyzed groups 
                                                          
8 The mathematical algorithm is described in 
https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSLVMB_22.0.0/com.ibm.spss.st
atistics.algorithms/alg_factor_promax.htm. Interested readers are also referred to 
materials used at the University of Texas in Dallas, available at 
https://www.utdallas.edu/~herve/Abdi-rotations-pretty.pdf.  
and sub-groups, a minimum sample size of at least 30 respondents per 
country had to be available to be able to attempt reasonable predictions 
(Clauß and Ebner, 1970). 
 
For the necessary calculation of error margins, readers are referred to the 
easily readable introduction to opinion survey error margins, prepared 
by Cornell University Roper Center’s https://ropercenter. cornell. 
edu/support/polling-fundamentals-total-survey-error/. Readers more 
interested in the details are also being referred to http://www. 
langerresearch. com/moe/. On the basis of the methodological literature 
on opinion surveys, this website makes available a direct opinion survey 
error margin calculator. It is important to recall that for example at a 5% 
rate of rejection of Jewish neighbors, error margins for a sample of 1.000 
representative interview partners are +-1.4%; and at a 10% rejection rate, 
the error margin is +-1.9%: and at a rejection rate of 15%, the error 
margin is +-2.2%; see http://www. langerresearch. com/moe/. That error 
margins differ according to reported rates of responses is an important 
fact of opinion survey research theory, often forgotten to be mentioned 
in the debate. Appendix Table 2 contains benchmark data on error 
margins, relevant for our study. 
 
Since any researcher around the globe should be able to reproduce our 
findings, our presentation of the results will be rather brief, and we 
concentrate here on the most salient results (see below). 
 
 
Results from the global comparisons  
 
 
In the 28 countries under comparison here, the following ranking of 
Antisemitic attitudes is to be observed (Table 1). In Iraq, Iran, Egypt and 
India, more than half of the entire resident population rejected to have a 
Jewish neighbor, while in Canada, Argentina, Belarus, Uruguay and the 
United States, this percentage was below 10%. It would be premature to 
interpret our results only along global denominational or world political 
conflict lines. Some Muslim majority societies, for example, Bangladesh 
and Albania, did even better than world political and military allies of 
the West, like South Korea, Slovakia, Japan and Spain. 
 
 
Table 1: percent of people saying that they reject to have a Jewish 
neighbor 
 
 
 % rejecting to have a 
Jewish neighbor 
N  
Iraq 90% 4924 
Iran 75% 2657 
Egypt 62% 3000 
India 53% 2500 
South Korea 41% 1200 
Nigeria 35% 1001 
Slovakia 34% 466 
Japan 28% 1011 
Bosnia 28% 1200 
Venezuela 26% 1200 
Mexico 26% 3895 
Moldova 25% 1008 
South Africa 24% 3000 
Spain 22% 2719 
Uganda 22% 1002 
Bangladesh 20% 1500 
Kyrgyzstan 20% 1043 
Macedonia 20% 1055 
Zimbabwe 19% 1002 
Czech Republic 18% 924 
Albania 17% 1000 
Chile 13% 3700 
Russia 11% 4001 
United States 9% 1200 
Uruguay 8% 2000 
Belarus 7% 2092 
Argentina 6% 3361 
Canada 4% 1931 
 
 
In Appendix Table 1 and in Graph 2, we test the relationship between 
Antisemitism (and other phobias) and the traditional self-positioning 
scale on the left to right political spectrum, reported in the World Values 
Survey. There is an Antisemitism of the political right and an 
Antisemitism of the political left. Most other global phobias correspond 
to this pattern: 
  
 Graph 2: The different phobias in the world system according to the 
left-right political spectrum: rejecting to have different types of 
neighbors according to respondents’ self-positioning on the left-right 
political scale. Data from the World Values Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
In view of the empirical weakness of the traditional explaining of 
Antisemitism by the political left-right scale (Adorno et al., 1950), it is no 
wonder that nowadays religion variables are increasingly used to 
explain the phenomenon of Antisemitism. In terms of the percentages of 
Antisemitism per global denomination, the following rank scale of 
Antisemitism by denomination emerges. There is a clear North-
West/South-East divide of global Antisemitism. World Values Survey 
respondents with a Muslim or Oriental Christian background or a 
Buddhist or Hindu background are much more Antisemitic than the 
adherents of mainstream Western Christianity, Orthodoxy or people 
without any denomination (see also Connelly, 2012): 
 
 
Table 2: Antisemitism by global denomination9 according to the World 
Values Survey 
 
 
Denomination % respondents reject to 
have a Jewish neighbor 
N 
Shia 83,0% 3743 
Sunni 74,6% 716 
Muslim 56,4% 9549 
Christian (oriental) 54,1% 207 
Hindu 51,0% 2408 
Buddhist 33,0% 591 
Total WVS global 
respondents 
31,0% 54944 
Independent African 
Churches (e.g. ZCC, 
Shembe, et cetera) 
22,9% 652 
Evangelical 21,5% 1047 
Protestant 19,9% 3629 
Other 18,5% 1135 
Roman Catholic 17,7% 15504 
Orthodox 16,4% 4941 
No religious 
denomination 
15,3% 10399 
 
 
As we already highlighted, World Values Survey studies on the effects of 
religious beliefs on human values often quantified the strength of these 
beliefs by variables such as “G’d important in your life” or by religious 
service attendance rates (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014).  
 
Here, we rather opted to work with the variable: Important in life: 
Religion: very important, rather important, not very important, not at all 
important, since we were faced with a large number of respondents, 
whose religious belief systems does not single out a personalized G’d (as 
                                                          
9 unweighted by the different population size in different countries 
in the three Abrahamic religions Judaism, Christianity and Islam). We 
document the mean rejection rate of Jewish neighbors (0, lowest, 1, 
highest) according to the SPSS routine “comparison of means”.  
 
On a global scale, there is a slight U-shaped relationship between the 
strength of religious beliefs across countries and denominations and 
Antisemitism, with both strong believers and people giving no 
importance to religion displaying a higher rate of Antisemitism.  
 
 
Table 3: average Antisemitism (rejecting Jewish neighbors, scale 
ranges from 0 to 1) according to the importance, attributed to religion 
according to the World Values Survey  
 
 
Important in life: 
Religion 
Antisemitism 
(rejecting a Jewish 
neighbor - 0 to 1) 
N = Standard 
deviation 
Very important 0,430 27566 0,495 
Rather important 0,220 12801 0,416 
Not very important 0,160 8942 0,371 
Not at all important 0,170 5456 0,373 
 
 
Table 4 disaggregates our findings for the different major global 
denominations. While in Protestantism and Christian Orthodoxy, whose 
cultures are characterized by high secularization, the already mentioned 
U-shaped effect of strong believers and people strongly distant from 
religion being more antisemitic reemerges. Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, 
Catholics and also people without denomination who give (great) 
importance in their lifes to religion are more antisemitic than the more 
secular Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Catholics and also people without 
denomination. 
 
  
  
Table 4: average Antisemitism (rejecting Jewish neighbors, scale 
ranges from 0 to 1) according to the importance, attributed to religion 
in major global denominations, according to the World Values Survey 
 
 
 Religion 
very 
important 
Religion 
rather 
important 
Religion 
not very 
important 
Religion 
not at all 
important 
Hindus 0,590 0,450 0,390 0,370 
Muslims 0,690 0,440 0,280 0,260 
Buddhists 0,360 0,380 0,310 0,280 
Global population 0,430 0,220 0,160 0,170 
Protestants 0,200 0,210 0,150 0,240 
Catholics 0,190 0,180 0,160 0,160 
Orthodox 0,210 0,150 0,130 0,160 
Without 
denomination 
0,180 0,160 0,130 0,150 
 
 
In Table 5, we analyze the relationship of other phobias (not wanting a 
neighbor who is a person of a different race, or a Muslim, or an 
immigrant, or a homosexual person) with the strength of religious 
feelings on a global scale. Three of the four analyzed phobias correspond 
to the patterns analyzed above. This implies that Hindus, Muslims, 
Buddhists, Catholics and also people without denomination who give 
great importance or importance to religion in their lifes are more 
xenophobic and homophobic than the secular Hindus, Muslims, 
Buddhists, Catholics and also people without denomination. The most 
religious segment of the global population embraces the highest phobias 
regarding race, immigrants and homosexuals. But the rejection of 
Muslim neighbors is highest among the most secular segment of global 
society. This finding suggests a future conflict axis already taking shape 
in many countries, including France (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 
2014). 
 
 Table 5: average other phobias (rejecting various types of neighbors, 
scale ranges from 0 to 1) according to the importance, attributed to 
religion by the global population, according to the World Values 
Survey 
 
 
Religion People of a 
different 
race 
Muslims Immigrants/f
oreign 
workers 
Homosexuals 
Very 
important 
0,210 0,200 0,260 0,590 
Rather 
important 
0,160 0,190 0,210 0,490 
Not very 
important 
0,130 0,190 0,180 0,420 
Not at all 
important 
0,130 0,210 0,180 0,390 
 
 
Results from the Promax factor analysis of World Values Survey data 
 
 
In the following, we attempt to explain our indicator “Rejecting to have 
Jewish neighbors” by nine variables in a promax factor analytical model. 
In the wording of our variables, we took great care to consider the exact 
meaning of the highest numerical values:  
 
• Not important in life: Religion 
• Important child qualities: religious faith 
• Satisfaction with your life 
• Satisfaction with financial situation of household 
• Reject opinion: University is more important for a boy than for a 
girl 
• Reject opinion: Politicians who don´t believe in God are unfit for 
public office 
• Gender (female) 
• Age 
• Highest educational level attained 
 
In Table 6, we first of all list the variables and the percentages of total 
variance explained (“extraction”): 
 
Table 6: the variables of the Promax factor analytical model 
 
 
 Extraction (from 
0 to 1) 
Not important in life: Religion 0,644 
Important child qualities: religious faith 0,606 
Rejecting to have Jewish neighbors 0,388 
Satisfaction with your life 0,775 
Satisfaction with financial situation of 
household 
0,789 
Reject opinion: University is more important 
for a boy than for a girl 
0,575 
Reject opinion: Politicians who don´t believe 
in God are unfit for public office 
0,556 
Gender (female) 0,660 
Age 0,608 
Highest educational level attained 0,601 
 
 
Table 7 shows the statistical properties of the model. There are four 
factors, whose so-called Eigenvalues are above 1.0, and which explain 
some 62% of the total variance. The Eigenvalue > 1.0 criterion is one of the 
most important benchmarks in the interpretation of factor analytical 
results (Finch, 2006; Gorsuch, 1983; Harman, 1976; Rummel, 1970). 
  
  
Table 7: Total variance explained by the factor analytical model 
 
 
 Eigenvalue % of variance 
explained 
cumulated total 
variance 
explained 
secularism 2,359 23,592 23,592 
life satisfaction 1,506 15,063 38,655 
highly educated 
younger generations 
1,176 11,764 50,419 
feminism 1,161 11,607 62,026 
 
 
The factor loadings as evidenced in the so-called structure matrix after 
the “rotation” of the factors are documented in Table 8. The statistical 
relationships between the extracted factors and the underlying variables 
(Gorsuch, 1983; Harman, 1976; Rummel, 1970) suggest to talk about four 
dimensions, to be called here: 
 
• secularism 
• life satisfaction 
• highly educated younger generations 
• feminism 
 
The methodological literature suggests to use all factor loadings equal or 
above 0.33 or above 0.50 for the naming of the different factor analytical 
dimensions. It is always subjective in character and open for a debate. It 
is imperative to mention the factor loadings in full in a research 
publication of this kind (Gorsuch, 1983; Harman, 1976; Rummel, 1970). 
 
Table 8 shows the factor loadings in the so-called structure matrix, while 
Table 9 documents the statistical relationships between the factors after 
the promax rotation. Graph 3 summarizes the results of our investigation 
for the study of Antisemitism: secularism, life satisfaction, and feminism 
all wield a negative, Antisemitism reducing effect. But the deficiencies of 
higher education in many so-called “Third World countries” and 
educational gaps between the generations enhance Antisemitism.  
 
 
Table 8: the factor loadings of the factor analytical model 
 
 
 secularism life 
satisfaction 
highly educated 
younger 
generations 
feminism 
Not important in life: Religion 0,789 0,076 0,107 -0,051 
Important child qualities: religious faith -0,772 -0,080 -0,054 0,014 
Rejecting to have Jewish neighbors -0,546 -0,137 0,124 -0,304 
Satisfaction with your life 0,181 0,878 0,016 0,096 
Satisfaction with financial situation of 
household 
0,060 0,882 0,085 0,002 
Reject opinion: University is more 
important for a boy than for a girl 
0,307 0,036 0,198 0,694 
Reject opinion: Politicians who don´t 
believe in God are unfit for public office 
0,743 0,131 0,043 0,145 
Gender (female) -0,119 0,039 -0,114 0,781 
Age 0,149 0,088 -0,745 -0,011 
Highest educational level attained 0,218 0,187 0,747 0,013 
 
  
 Table 9: correlations between the factors 
 
 
Component … correlation with secularism life 
satisfaction 
highly educated 
younger 
generations 
feminism 
secularism 1,000 0,152 0,076 0,104 
life satisfaction 0,152 1,000 0,046 0,064 
highly educated younger generations 0,076 0,046 1,000 -0,010 
feminism 0,104 0,064 -0,010 1,000 
 
  
 Graph 3: Factor loadings of Antisemitism 
 
 
 
 
 Thus, our analysis shows that secularism and feminism are the most 
robust blocks against the resurgence of Antisemitism, world-wide. The 
factor “life satisfaction” (life satisfaction and satisfaction with the 
financial position of the household) wields only a small influence on the 
extent of Antisemitism, showing that Antisemitism is both a 
phenomenon of the rich and the poor. 
 
Table 10 and our choropleth maps (Map 2, Map 3, Map 4, Map 5) 
document the country results (factor scores) of our investigation.  
 
Our combined new measurement scales for  
 
• secularism 
• life satisfaction 
• highly educated younger generations 
• feminism 
 
show a clear North/South and West/East divide of the phenomena 
involved. The highest concentration of the drivers of Antisemitism is to 
be found in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and West 
Asia. Table 10 and our choropleth maps (Map 2, Map 3, Map 4, Map 5) 
hold important messages for the debate of “multiculturalism”, already 
foreseen by Wistrich, 2007: the areas of origin of mass migration to 
Western countries since the 1990s are all characterized by conditions, 
leading to higher rates of Antisemitism. Table 10 and the choropleth 
maps (Map 2, Map 3, Map 4, Map 5) closely correspond to the findings 
reported in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3, above: 
 
 Table 10: Country factor scores of the analysis 
 
 
Country/region  secularism life 
satisfaction 
highly educated 
younger 
generations 
feminism 
Albania Mean 0,565 -0,281 -0,146 0,175 
 N 855 855 855 855 
 Standard deviation 0,860 0,879 1,006 0,941 
Argentina Mean 0,473 0,287 -0,450 0,272 
 N 1129 1129 1129 1129 
 Standard deviation 0,821 0,852 1,025 0,907 
Bangladesh Mean -0,396 0,075 -0,021 -0,411 
 N 1206 1206 1206 1206 
 Standard deviation 0,586 0,859 0,898 0,911 
Bosnia Mean 0,694 -0,151 -0,083 0,120 
 N 1082 1082 1082 1082 
 Standard deviation 0,789 0,933 0,945 0,929 
Canada Mean 0,891 0,746 -0,123 0,340 
 N 1847 1847 1847 1847 
 Standard deviation 0,830 0,787 1,065 0,846 
Chile Mean 0,500 0,332 -0,312 0,113 
 N 1086 1086 1086 1086 
 Standard deviation 0,814 0,853 1,074 1,013 
Iran Mean -0,633 0,205 0,359 -0,405 
 N 2412 2412 2412 2412 
 Standard deviation 0,733 0,874 0,936 0,962 
Iraq Mean -1,087 -0,379 0,055 -0,455 
 N 3765 3765 3765 3765 
 Standard deviation 0,479 0,899 0,879 1,027 
South Korea Mean 0,839 0,179 0,547 -0,070 
 N 1005 1005 1005 1005 
 Standard deviation 0,808 0,848 0,808 0,994 
Kyrgyzstan Mean 0,618 0,191 0,351 0,044 
 N 1009 1009 1009 1009 
 Standard deviation 0,761 0,979 0,918 0,967 
Moldova Mean 0,349 -0,511 -0,073 -0,002 
 N 800 800 800 800 
 Standard deviation 0,772 0,879 1,126 0,904 
South Africa Mean -0,032 -0,181 0,163 0,231 
 N 2674 2674 2674 2674 
 Standard deviation 0,706 1,052 0,881 0,971 
Zimbabwe Mean -0,212 -0,956 -0,306 0,340 
 N 889 889 889 889 
 Standard deviation 0,605 1,002 0,898 0,924 
Spain Mean 0,950 0,394 -0,332 0,117 
 N 1022 1022 1022 1022 
 Standard deviation 0,736 0,679 1,265 0,903 
Uganda Mean -0,207 -0,228 0,206 0,265 
 N 927 927 927 927 
 Standard deviation 0,638 0,976 0,740 1,039 
Macedonia Mean 0,560 -0,341 -0,194 0,245 
 N 935 935 935 935 
 Standard deviation 0,841 1,027 1,023 0,932 
Egypt Mean -0,853 -0,212 0,033 -0,104 
 N 2305 2305 2305 2305 
 Standard deviation 0,455 1,121 0,984 1,029 
United States Mean 0,330 0,654 0,105 0,333 
 N 1163 1163 1163 1163 
 Standard deviation 0,829 0,799 0,940 0,871 
Uruguay Mean 1,042 0,454 -0,702 0,233 
 N 907 907 907 907 
 Standard deviation 0,732 0,741 1,071 0,822 
Total Mean 0 0 0 0 
 N 27019 27019 27019 27019 
 Standard deviation 1 1 1 1 
 
 Map 2: secularism  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1,35 to -1,09
-1,09 to -0,82
-0,82 to -0,55
-0,55 to -0,29
-0,29 to -0,02
-0,02 to 0,24
0,24 to 0,51
0,51 to 0,78
0,78 to 1,04
1,04 or more
-1,35 to -1,09
-1,09 to -0,82
-0,82 to -0,55
-0,55 to -0,29
-0,29 to -0,02
-0,02 to 0,24
0,24 to 0,51
0,51 to 0,78
0,78 to 1,04
1,04 or more
Highest: Uruguay; Spain; Canada; Korea, South; Bosnia;  
Lowest: Iraq; Egypt; Iran; Bangladesh; Zimbabwe 
 
Map 3: life satisfaction  
 
 
 
 
 
-1,17 to -0,96
-0,96 to -0,74
-0,74 to -0,53
-0,53 to -0,32
-0,32 to -0,10
-0,10 to 0,11
0,11 to 0,32
0,32 to 0,53
0,53 to 0,75
0,75 or more
-1,17 to -0,96
-0,96 to -0,74
-0,74 to -0,53
-0,53 to -0,32
-0,32 to -0,10
-0,10 to 0,11
0,11 to 0,32
0,32 to 0,53
0,53 to 0,75
0,75 or more
 Highest: Canada; United States; Uruguay; Spain; Chile;  
Lowest: Zimbabwe; Moldova; Iraq; Macedonia; Albania 
 
Map 4: higher education younger generations  
 
 
 
 
-0,86 to -0,70
-0,70 to -0,55
-0,55 to -0,39
-0,39 to -0,23
-0,23 to -0,08
-0,08 to 0,08
0,08 to 0,23
0,23 to 0,39
0,39 to 0,55
0,55 or more
-0,86 to -0,70
-0,70 to -0,55
-0,55 to -0,39
-0,39 to -0,23
-0,23 to -0,08
-0,08 to 0,08
0,08 to 0,23
0,23 to 0,39
0,39 to 0,55
0,55 or more
  
Highest: Korea, South; Iran; Kyrgyzstan; Uganda; South Africa;  
Lowest: Uruguay; Argentina; Spain; Chile; Zimbabwe 
 
 
Map 5: feminism  
 
 
 
 
-0,55 to -0,45
-0,45 to -0,36
-0,36 to -0,26
-0,26 to -0,16
-0,16 to -0,06
-0,06 to 0,04
0,04 to 0,14
0,14 to 0,24
0,24 to 0,34
0,34 or more
 
 
 
 
Highest: Canada; Zimbabwe; United States; Argentina; Uganda;  
Lowest: Iraq; Bangladesh; Iran; Egypt; Korea, South 
 
 
In Table 11, we calculated an overall indicator of the social conditions 
preventing Antisemitism. This calculation is based on the well-
established research technique of the multiplication of the country factor 
scores with the Eigenvalues of each factor (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 
2014). In our case, we used the factors secularism, life satisfaction, and 
feminism. The results of this procedure are reported in Table 11: 
  
-0,55 to -0,45
-0,45 to -0,36
-0,36 to -0,26
-0,26 to -0,16
-0,16 to -0,06
-0,06 to 0,04
0,04 to 0,14
0,14 to 0,24
0,24 to 0,34
0,34 or more
  
Table 11: social conditions working against Antisemitism 
 
 
Country/region secularism life 
satisfaction 
feminism Index of social 
conditions 
preventing 
Antisemitism 
Canada 2,102 1,124 0,395 3,622 
Uruguay 2,459 0,684 0,271 3,414 
Spain 2,241 0,594 0,136 2,970 
Korea, South 1,979 0,270 -0,082 2,168 
United States 0,777 0,985 0,387 2,149 
Argentina 1,115 0,432 0,315 1,862 
Chile 1,180 0,500 0,132 1,812 
Kyrgyzstan 1,458 0,287 0,051 1,796 
Bosnia 1,638 -0,228 0,139 1,549 
Albania 1,332 -0,424 0,203 1,112 
Macedonia 1,322 -0,514 0,285 1,092 
Moldova 0,824 -0,769 -0,003 0,052 
South Africa -0,075 -0,273 0,269 -0,079 
Uganda -0,488 -0,343 0,308 -0,523 
Bangladesh -0,933 0,113 -0,477 -1,297 
Zimbabwe -0,500 -1,439 0,395 -1,545 
Iran -1,493 0,308 -0,470 -1,655 
Egypt -2,013 -0,320 -0,121 -2,454 
Iraq -2,563 -0,571 -0,528 -3,662 
 
 
In Graph 4, we compare the results of the above reported Table 11 with 
the results of Table 1. The Index of social conditions preventing 
Antisemitism has an expected and clear negative and linear correlation 
with the percentage of people rejecting to have Jewish neighbors, and the 
explained variance is above 55%: 
 
 
Graph 4: How the social conditions, defined by secularism, life 
satisfaction and feminism prevent Antisemitism 
 
 
 
 
x-axis: Index of social conditions preventing Antisemitism. 
 
This result can be regarded as one of the main findings of our 
multivariate analysis. Secularism, life satisfaction and feminism explain 
55% of Antisemitism. 
 
 
Results from the multiple regression analysis of World Values Survey 
data 
 
 
Graph 5 and Table 12 contain the regression analytical results of our 
investigation showing the importance of the variables about a 
fundamentalist interpretation of the relationship between religion and 
state and the sexist inclination to reserve higher education only for male 
persons.  
 
The dependent variable in the multiple standard OLS regression is 
Antisemitism (rejection of a Jewish neighbor; 0 = no rejection; 1 = 
rejection). The independent variables in our research endeavor were: 
 
• Not important in life: Religion 
• Important child qualities: religious faith 
• Satisfaction with your life 
• Satisfaction with financial situation of household 
• Reject opinion: University is more important for a boy than for a 
girl 
• Gender (female) 
• Age 
• Highest educational level attained 
• Reject opinion: Politicians who don´t believe in God are unfit for 
public office 
 
The model could be calculated for more than 27.000 WVS respondents, 
all indicators (except the higher education variable) wield a very 
significant effect on Antisemitism, the entire equation achieves an F-
Ratio of more than 500 and is thus highly significant, and the explained 
R^2 is 14.8%. Graph 5 and Table 12 shows the high weight – ceteris 
paribus – of fundamentalism and sexism in explaining Antisemitism. 
 
  
 Graph 5: the drivers of Antisemitism (t-test) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: explaining global Antisemitism (rejection of Jewish neighbors) according to the data of the World 
Values Survey by multiple regression (standard OLS regression) 
 
 Regression 
coefficient B 
Standard 
error 
Beta T Error p. 
Constant 0,878 0,018 xxx 49,024 0,000 
Not important in life: Religion -0,037 0,004 -0,070 -10,014 0,000 
Important child qualities: 
religious faith 
0,123 0,007 0,126 18,434 0,000 
Satisfaction with your life -0,020 0,001 -0,112 -16,244 0,000 
Satisfaction with financial 
situation of household 
0,009 0,001 0,049 7,172 0,000 
Reject opinion: University is 
more important for a boy than 
for a girl 
-0,056 0,003 -0,111 -18,920 0,000 
Gender (female) -0,019 0,006 -0,020 -3,414 0,001 
Age -0,002 0,000 -0,064 -11,112 0,000 
Highest educational level attained 0,001 0,001 0,003 0,478 0,633 
Reject opinion: Politicians who 
don´t believe in God are unfit 
for public office 
-0,064 0,002 -0,184 -28,090 0,000 
 
N = 27019; adj. R^2 = 14.8%; F = 521,170; error p = .000 
  
Discussion on other drivers of Antisemitism 
 
 
Table 13 answers the question whether or not the partial correlation 
relationships of Antisemitism with other variables confirm the 
multivariate analyses presented above. Each time, satisfaction with life & 
satisfaction with the financial situation of the household & gender & age 
was kept constant. Apart from the fact that the different phobias 
registered in the World Values Survey closely are connected with each 
other, including Antisemitism, it emerges that authoritarian expectations 
about the nature of democracy have the highest and most consistent 
partial correlation relationships with Antisemitism. To say that it is 
essential in a democracy that religious authorities interpret the laws, and 
that in a democracy, criminals should be severely punished correlates 
significantly with Antisemitism. Table 13 thus shows the most important 
partial correlation relationships between WVS variables, important for 
the study of prejudice, and Antisemitism. 
 
Our Table also answers many detailed aspects of the intricate 
relationship between religion and Antisemitism. For example, the 
relationship between the belief in G’d variable and Antisemitism is close 
to zero, while the partial correlation between the belief in re-incarnation 
and Antisemitism is clearly significant. Interestingly enough, a 
preference for state ownership of the means of production is significantly 
and positively related to Antisemitism.  
 
Our readers can interpret the other results of Table 13 for their own 
scholarly agenda, in view of the great number of reported research 
results which should serve as a first selection for future fruitful empirical 
investigations on the subject. 
 
  
 Table 13: partial correlations with Antisemitism. Constant: Satisfaction 
with your life & Satisfaction with financial situation of household & 
Sex & Age 
 
 
 partial 
correlation 
with 
Antisemitism 
error 
probabil
ity 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
Believe in: devil -0,002 0,770 20165 
Believe in: God 0,077 0,000 44716 
Believe in: heaven 0,109 0,000 42449 
Believe in: hell 0,135 0,000 41910 
Believe in: life after death 0,096 0,000 41529 
Believe in: people have a soul 0,068 0,000 43241 
Believe in: re-incarnation 0,192 0,000 10209 
Believe in: sin 0,020 0,005 20774 
Competition good or harmful -0,026 0,000 45631 
Democracy: Civil rights protect 
people’s liberty against oppression. 
0,069 0,000 5895 
Democracy: Criminals are severely 
punished 
0,252 0,000 6013 
Democracy: Governments tax the 
rich and subsidize the poor. 
0,156 0,000 5984 
Democracy: People can change the 
laws in referendums. 
-0,040 0,002 5938 
Democracy: People choose their leaders 
in free elections. 
-0,006 0,662 6027 
Democracy: People receive state 
aid for unemployment. 
0,099 0,000 5989 
Democracy: Religious authorities 
interpret the laws. 
0,261 0,000 5904 
Democracy: The army takes over 
when government is incompetent. 
0,283 0,000 5852 
Democracy: The economy is 
prospering. 
0,177 0,000 6024 
Democracy: Women have the same 
rights as men. 
-0,182 0,000 6034 
Hard work does not bring success -0,113 0,000 26804 
Important child qualities: 
determination perseverance 
-0,074 0,000 53261 
Important child qualities: feeling of 
responsibility 
0,010 0,025 55065 
Important child qualities: good 
manners 
0,128 0,000 30780 
Important child qualities: hard 
work 
0,012 0,006 53261 
Important child qualities: 
imagination 
-0,037 0,000 53261 
Important child qualities: 
independence 
-0,020 0,000 55065 
Important child qualities: 
obedience 
0,118 0,000 55065 
Important child qualities: religious 
faith 
0,242 0,000 55065 
Important child qualities: thrift saving 
money and things 
-0,005 0,205 55065 
Important child qualities: tolerance 
and respect for other people 
0,008 0,067 55065 
Important child qualities: 
unselfishness 
-0,035 0,000 53261 
no confidence: Armed Forces -0,093 0,000 54128 
no confidence: Churches -0,105 0,000 54528 
no confidence: Education System -0,132 0,000 13243 
no confidence: Justice 
System/Courts 
-0,098 0,000 27377 
no confidence: Labour Unions -0,063 0,000 46972 
no confidence: Major Companies 0,008 0,069 47362 
no confidence: NATO 0,026 0,000 24811 
no confidence: Parliament -0,085 0,000 48756 
no confidence: Social Security 
System 
-0,083 0,000 12998 
no confidence: Television -0,091 0,000 47832 
no confidence: The Civil Services -0,070 0,000 48390 
no confidence: The Environmental 
Protection Movement 
0,022 0,000 33672 
no confidence: The European Union 0,016 0,058 13431 
no confidence: The Government -0,045 0,000 49909 
no confidence: The Police -0,097 0,000 50048 
no confidence: The Political Parties -0,050 0,000 45929 
no confidence: The Press -0,062 0,000 49453 
no confidence: The United Nations 0,206 0,000 36833 
no confidence: The Women´s 
Movement 
-0,012 0,034 33272 
Private vs state ownership of 
business 
0,122 0,000 52366 
reject neighbors: Drug addicts 0,141 0,000 50662 
reject neighbors: Emotionally 
unstable people 
0,203 0,000 47005 
reject neighbors: Heavy drinkers 0,181 0,000 50662 
reject neighbors: Homosexuals 0,275 0,000 50660 
reject neighbors: 
Immigrants/foreign workers 
0,457 0,000 50660 
reject neighbors: Muslims 0,464 0,000 31731 
reject neighbors: People of a 
different race 
0,390 0,000 50661 
reject neighbors: People who have 
AIDS 
0,330 0,000 50661 
reject neighbors: People with a 
criminal record 
0,225 0,000 51900 
 
  
 Religion and Antisemitism – the cross-national evidence from the ADL 
data 
 
 
To wind up our research results, we also report a multiple regression 
about the explanation of the ADL-100 nation level Antisemitism rates by 
cross-national economic and social background variables. 
 
So, in Table 14, we ask ourselves whether standard variables of 
international development accounting, gathered by the World Bank 
(2017) and the UNPD (2017), as well as Alesina’s societal trust variable 
(Alesina & Guiliano, 2013, 205; Alesina & Ferrara, 2000; Alesina et al., 
2015) and Barro’s religious adherence data (2003) sufficiently well 
explain the global ADL, 2014 Antisemitism rates. We expect that first 
there is an increase of Antisemitism with rising per capita incomes, 
levelling off at higher income levels. Mean years of education will be an 
important impediment against Antisemitism, and a climate of societal 
trust will diminish Antisemitism. Unfortunately, it is evident that with 
all these other factors being constant, adherence to Catholicism, 
Orthodox Christianity and Islam all are still to be considered as 
significant drivers of the rate of societal Antisemitism, all reflecting the 
centuries of Antisemitism in the concrete, but different history of the 
religious institutions in these cultures. 
 
Table 14: The drivers of global Antisemitism (ADL, 2014)  
 
 Regression 
coefficient B 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient Beta 
T = Error p 
Constant 9,131 9,674  0,944 0,348 
Mean Years of Schooling 2013 (UNDP 
HDR 2014) 
-1,958 1,033 -0,219 -1,896 0,062 
income 2013 (EU =100) (World Bank, 2017) 18,054 6,099 1,023 2,960 0,004 
income 2013 (EU =100) ^2 (World Bank, 
2017) 
-1,985 0,915 -0,708 -2,170 0,033 
% Roman Catholics per 2000 (Barro, 2003) 10,772 5,314 0,173 2,027 0,046 
% Orthodox per 2000 (Barro, 2003) 35,687 8,588 0,318 4,155 0,000 
% Muslims per 2000 (Barro, 2003) 54,565 5,635 0,825 9,684 0,000 
Gallup poll about trust in other people 
(UNDP, 2014) 
-0,322 0,137 -0,176 -2,344 0,022 
 
Adj. R^2 = 69%; n = 87 countries; F = 28. 363; error p = . 000 
Data from the ADL (2014); World Bank, UNDP, Robert Barro (Harvard) 
 
 The factor trust, highlighted by Alesina, is an important stabilizing factor 
for an open society. In our analysis, this also holds true for the 
determination of the absence of large-scale Antisemitism by the factor 
trust. The percentage of Roman Catholicism per total population, and the 
percentages of Christian Orthodox believers and the percentages of 
Muslims are all significant drivers of Antisemitism. There is a so-called 
Kuznets curve (Kuznets, 1976) of Antisemitism, suggesting that 
antisemitism coincides with the modernization crisis experienced by 
semi-industrial societies at middle stages of development.  
 
 
Conclusions and prospects 
 
 
Even in the ideologically charged atmosphere of debates on 
“multiculturalism” in most Western countries, with right-wing and 
xenophobic political parties and social movements challenging the 
multicultural intellectual consensus of the 1990s and the first decade of 
the 21st Century, we should dare to ask the question already raised by 
Wistrich, 2007 about the future of multiculturalism in the light of the 
evidence, emerging from Map 1 and other Tables, Maps and Graphs of 
this article. These materials dramatically highlight the prevalence of 
Antisemitism in many parts of the Muslim world (Kressel, 2012), and not 
only there. Look at the Antisemitism data for the Catholic faithful in 
Slovakia; Bosnia; Spain; and Albania in Table 15 below, you realize how 
European Catholic Church leaders and European Catholic communities 
at large failed to implement the teachings of the Second Vatican Council. 
In the entire future global parallelogram of ideological and political 
forces of our globe, Roman Catholicism indeed will also still play an 
important role, the trends towards Secularism notwithstanding. Is the 
world of Roman Catholicism nowadays really so immune from 
Antisemitism, as the Second Vatican Council hopefully suggested? The 
Vatican Council’s “Nostra aetate”10 declaration famously stressed what it 
calls  
                                                          
10 http://www. vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en. html. 
 the bond that spiritually ties the people of the New Covenant to Abraham's 
stock: Since the spiritual patrimony common to Christians and Jews is thus so 
great, this sacred synod wants to foster and recommend that mutual 
understanding and respect which is the fruit, above all, of biblical and 
theological studies as well as of fraternal dialogues. Furthermore, in her rejection 
of every persecution against any man, the Church, mindful of the patrimony she 
shares with the Jews and moved not by political reasons but by the Gospel's 
spiritual love, decries hatred, persecutions, displays of anti-Semitism, directed 
against Jews at any time and by anyone.  
 
Our data lamentably clearly show, that Vatican II did not as yet become 
a reality in many Catholic countries more than five decades after the 
Second Vatican Council. What has become true for the Catholicism of 
Canada and the United States five decades after Vatican II, did not 
necessarily happen to the ten most antisemitic Catholic communities of 
devout Catholics, attending each Sunday the Catholic Church service in, 
say, South Korea; South Africa; Slovakia; Nigeria; Bosnia; Venezuela; 
Spain; Albania; Uganda; and Mexico (see Table 15, below). And what 
was the evidence from other global denominations? Is, say, Hindu or 
Buddhist religiosity connected with a higher or lower rate of 
Antisemitism, irrespective of other possibly intervening variables? 
 
This paper attempted a multivariate analysis of global Antisemitism, 
based on measuring Antisemitism by the rejection of Jewish neighbors 
from the World Values Survey data. In the 28 countries under comparison 
here, we found that the highest rates of Antisemitism prevail in Iraq, 
Iran, Egypt and India, where more than half of the entire resident 
population rejected to have a Jewish neighbor, while in Canada, 
Argentina, Belarus, Uruguay and the United States, this percentage was 
below 10%. While it would be premature to interpret our results only 
along global denominational or world political conflict lines, there is 
indeed a clear South-North and West-East divide of Antisemitism. We 
clearly show that there is a U-shaped relationship between political 
orientation and Antisemitism, with Antisemitism lowest among self-
declared adherents of the global moderate left and highest among 
adherents of both the extreme left and the extreme right. We provide 
data about the religious background of Antisemitism and found that – 
like with other phobias and prejudices - Antisemitism was highest 
among World Values Survey respondents with a Muslim or Oriental 
Christian background or a Buddhist or Hindu background. There is a 
slight U-shaped relationship between the strength of religious beliefs 
across countries viz. denominations and Antisemitism, with both strong 
believers and people giving no importance to religion displaying a 
higher rate of Antisemitism than those people who attach not very a big 
importance to religion in their personal lifes.  
 
Our multivariate analyses based on promax factor analysis and multiple 
regression analysis found in addition that secularism, life satisfaction, 
and feminism all wield a negative, Antisemitism reducing effect on the 
extent of Antisemitism. But the deficiencies of higher education in many 
so-called “Third World countries” and educational gaps between the 
generations enhance Antisemitism.11 Secularism, combined with a 
healthy separation of religion and state; and feminism are the most 
robust blocks against the resurgence of Antisemitism, world-wide. The 
factor “life satisfaction”, combining life satisfaction proper with 
satisfaction about the financial position of the household, wields only a 
                                                          
11 We draw our readers’ attention to the fact that the positive effects of mean years of 
overall education on the reduction of societal Antisemitism are considerable, see 
Table 14, based on country-wide ADL data and data from international standard 
sources. Although this theme is beyond the scope of this essay, it suffices to say here 
that the analysis of the curricula and the library holdings on issues of Judaism, the 
Shoah et cetera in many centers of higher learning in the Muslim world are still 
deficient, to say the least. In its 2014 study, the ADL ran extra questions regarding 
awareness about the Shoah. Only 33 percent of the global population today are aware 
of the Shoah and believe it has been accurately described by history. In Oceania, it is 
82 percent, in Western Europe, it is 77 percent, in Eastern Europe it is 57 percent, in 
the Americas, this percentage is 55 percent, in Asia it is 23 percent, in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, it is 12 percent, in Oceania it is 82 percent. Notably, in the MENA region 
(Middle East and North Africa), it is only 8 percent. Global, regional, and national 
Union catalogues of the academic libraries around the world inform us about the 
quality or dearth of academic library holdings on issues of Judaism, the Shoah et 
cetera corresponds roughly to the geographical structure, mentioned in the ADL 
(2014) study. The more that future global opinion leaders are educated in a spirit of 
tolerance, Enlightenment and Jewish culture and history, the more the world will be 
able to eradicate Antisemitism. 
smaller influence on the extent of Antisemitism, showing that 
Antisemitism is both a phenomenon of the rich and the poor. 
 
Our combined new measurement scales for  
 
• secularism 
• life satisfaction 
• highly educated younger generations 
• feminism 
 
showed again the North/South and West/East divide of Antisemitism, 
with the highest concentration of the drivers of Antisemitism to be found 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and West Asia. The 
regression analytical results of our investigation based on World Values 
Survey data yet again show the connection between a fundamentalist 
interpretation of the relationship between religion and state, and the 
sexist inclination to reserve higher education only for male persons on 
the one hand and Antisemitism on the other hand. This finding echoes 
the evidence, based on factor analysis.  
 
Also, partial correlation relationships of Antisemitism confirm the 
multivariate analyses already presented. Authoritarian expectations 
about the nature of democracy have the highest and most consistent 
partial correlation relationships with Antisemitism. To say that it is 
essential that in a democracy, religious authorities interpret the laws, 
and that in a democracy, criminals should be severely punished, 
correlates significantly with Antisemitism, independent from other 
important factors such as age, education, and position in society. Sharia 
courts, amputating thieves and having adulterers whipped, and supreme 
religious councils, passing or rejecting laws promulgated by the elected 
parliament would be instances what could be understood by a 
democracy severely punishing criminals and by religious authorities 
interpreting the laws. 
 
We also reported a multiple regression about the explanation of the 
ADL-100 nation level Antisemitism rates by cross-national economic and 
social background variables. Unfortunately, it is evident that the 
adherence to Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and Islam all are still to 
be considered as significant drivers of the rate of societal Antisemitism. 
 
To debunk the codes of religious Antisemitism in Christianity, it took the 
intellectual capital, braveness and iron will of people like Jules Isaac and 
James Parkes (Isaac, 1960; Parkes, 1974). Our investigation shows that 
religion, sexism and fundamentalism still can be strong driving forces of 
Antisemitism in the world today. With mass migration from regions, 
which precisely are high-risk zones for the rise of Antisemitism, we 
cannot escape, with Wistrich (2007), also debate about multiculturalism 
at the end of this essay. Multiculturalism, in the words of Bernstein 
(1994): 
 
“condemns Western culture as racist, sexist, and imperialist, … while elevating 
the virtues of non-Western, non-patriarchal, and minority cultures as 
underrepresented and underappreciated.” 
 
and 
 
“If you want real multiculturalism, get on an airplane and go someplace else—
out there in that great region of the world called Abroad, where practices like 
female circumcision abound, along with amputation of the hands of thieves, 
head-to-foot veils for women, and death sentences for those who write 
supposedly “blasphemous” books. That place called Abroad, by the way, is not 
the place where tolerance for homosexuality was invented, or equal rights for 
women, or where the phrase about all men being born equal and endowed by 
their creator with certain inalienable rights was struck.” 
 
In our concluding Table 15 we summarize our rather bleak final results 
of our World Values Survey based investigation. In that Table, we 
highlight the available evidence and data for the active segment of global 
Catholicism, i.e. those Catholics who attend, as prescribed by their faith 
(John Paul II, 1994), each Sunday the Roman Catholic Church service, 
compared with data for numerically major other religious 
denominations. This statistical exercise might be painful for Roman 
Catholic audiences, but the stark statistical facts for parts of global 
Catholicism today just are that: 
 Table 15: The performance of different denominations in overcoming Antisemitism – a global comparison, 
based on World Values Survey data 
 
 
Rank in 
overcoming 
Antisemitism 
Sample Country/region Antisemitism 
(average rejection 
of Jewish 
neighbors, scale 0-
1) 
N percentile 
performance 
1 Protestants Uruguay 0,000 30 1,14 
2 Protestants Canada 0,020 336 2,27 
3 Protestants Argentina 0,020 44 3,41 
4 countrywide Canada 0,040 1931 4,55 
5 countrywide Argentina 0,060 3361 5,68 
6 Dominicantes Argentina 0,060 607 6,82 
7 Dominicantes United States 0,060 145 7,95 
8 Orthodox Belarus 0,060 1145 9,09 
9 countrywide Belarus 0,070 2092 10,23 
10 Dominicantes Canada 0,070 219 11,36 
11 Protestants United States 0,070 313 12,50 
12 countrywide Uruguay 0,080 2000 13,64 
13 Dominicantes India 0,080 38 14,77 
14 Muslims Russia 0,080 104 15,91 
15 countrywide United States 0,090 1200 17,05 
16 Orthodox Kyrgyzstan 0,100 78 18,18 
17 countrywide Russia 0,110 4001 19,32 
18 Orthodox Russia 0,110 1525 20,45 
19 Protestants Albania 0,110 180 21,59 
20 Dominicantes Belarus 0,120 49 22,73 
21 countrywide Chile 0,130 3700 23,86 
22 Dominicantes Chile 0,130 666 25,00 
23 Dominicantes Uruguay 0,130 128 26,14 
24 Dominicantes Czech Republic 0,140 51 27,27 
25 Dominicantes Zimbabwe 0,160 131 28,41 
26 countrywide Albania 0,170 1000 29,55 
27 Muslims South Africa 0,170 84 30,68 
28 countrywide Czech Republic 0,180 924 31,82 
29 Protestants Uganda 0,180 443 32,95 
30 countrywide Zimbabwe 0,190 1002 34,09 
31 Muslims Bangladesh 0,190 1378 35,23 
32 Orthodox Macedonia 0,190 627 36,36 
33 Orthodox Chile 0,190 139 37,50 
34 Orthodox Mexico 0,190 37 38,64 
35 Protestants Venezuela 0,190 75 39,77 
36 countrywide Bangladesh 0,200 1500 40,91 
37 countrywide Macedonia 0,200 1055 42,05 
38 countrywide Kyrgyzstan 0,200 1043 43,18 
39 Muslims Macedonia 0,200 266 44,32 
40 Protestants Czech Republic 0,200 51 45,45 
41 Protestants Zimbabwe 0,210 273 46,59 
42 countrywide Spain 0,220 2719 47,73 
43 countrywide Uganda 0,220 1002 48,86 
44 Hindus South Africa 0,220 54 50,00 
45 Dominicantes Mexico 0,230 1369 51,14 
46 Muslims Kyrgyzstan 0,230 775 52,27 
47 countrywide South Africa 0,240 3000 53,41 
48 Dominicantes Uganda 0,240 283 54,55 
49 Dominicantes Albania 0,240 119 55,68 
50 Protestants South Africa 0,240 1048 56,82 
51 Buddhists Japan 0,250 272 57,95 
52 countrywide Moldova 0,250 1008 59,09 
53 Orthodox Moldova 0,250 878 60,23 
54 Protestants Chile 0,250 62 61,36 
55 countrywide Mexico 0,260 3895 62,50 
56 countrywide Venezuela 0,260 1200 63,64 
57 Dominicantes Spain 0,270 671 64,77 
58 Protestants Nigeria 0,270 211 65,91 
59 countrywide Bosnia 0,280 1200 67,05 
60 countrywide Japan 0,280 1011 68,18 
61 Muslims Bosnia 0,280 485 69,32 
62 Dominicantes Venezuela 0,300 321 70,45 
63 Dominicantes Bosnia 0,300 84 71,59 
64 Protestants Mexico 0,310 158 72,73 
65 Protestants Slovakia 0,330 40 73,86 
66 countrywide Slovakia 0,340 466 75,00 
67 countrywide Nigeria 0,350 1001 76,14 
68 Dominicantes Nigeria 0,350 193 77,27 
69 Muslims Uganda 0,350 169 78,41 
70 Protestants South Korea 0,350 284 79,55 
71 Hindus Bangladesh 0,360 107 80,68 
72 Orthodox Bosnia 0,360 248 81,82 
73 Dominicantes Slovakia 0,370 147 82,95 
74 Dominicantes South Africa 0,380 210 84,09 
75 Dominicantes South Korea 0,400 89 85,23 
76 countrywide South Korea 0,410 1200 86,36 
77 Muslims Nigeria 0,410 248 87,50 
78 Orthodox Nigeria 0,430 176 88,64 
79 Buddhists South Korea 0,440 250 89,77 
80 countrywide India 0,530 2500 90,91 
81 Hindus India 0,530 2206 92,05 
82 countrywide Egypt 0,620 3000 93,18 
83 Muslims Egypt 0,620 2830 94,32 
84 Muslims India 0,640 138 95,45 
85 countrywide Iran 0,750 2657 96,59 
86 Muslims Iran 0,750 2614 97,73 
87 countrywide Iraq 0,900 4924 98,86 
88 Muslims Iraq 0,900 4874 100,00 
 
 But our Table above does not only hold implications for immigration 
policy and social integration policy decision makers in the context of 
multiculturalism. To underestimate the gaps in tolerance, characterizing 
the world today, also has implications for religious leaders and also the 
global research community. As Wistrich showed in his prophetic 
analysis, written in 2007, we must become finally able to address the 
tolerance deficits in many countries on earth, which became the 
countries of origin of the recent huge movements of migration to the 
rich, Western, democracies. To negate this real threat for the future of a 
climate of tolerance and liberal democracy in the West is simply out of 
touch with reality and is contradicted by solid global evidence about 
global values, to which this essay attempted to make a modest 
contribution. Rather than expecting rising global existential security, 
which will be diminishing prejudice (Inglehart, 2018) in the migration 
sending and recipient countries, we now can expect rising prejudice in 
the framework of shrinking existential security and rising inequality on a 
global scale. This is the stark world of 2018, and it is time that social 
policy and also the social sciences take account of this reality. 
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Appendix Table 1 Left-right spectrum and the mean rejection rates of different types of neighbors in the world 
system according to the World Values Survey 
 
 
Self-positioning on 
the political scale 
People 
of a 
different 
race 
Immigran
ts/foreign 
workers 
Homosex
uals 
Jews People of a 
different 
religion 
Muslims Gypsies 
Left Mean 0,19 0,22 0,54 0,24 0,21 0,20 0,33 
 N 13157 13037 13034 2432 8052 3481 511 
 Standard 
deviation 
0,396 0,416 0,498 0,425 0,404 0,399 0,472 
2 Mean 0,16 0,19 0,49 0,21 0,17 0,19 0,41 
 N 7900 7880 7723 1470 4967 2188 447 
 Standard 
deviation 
0,364 0,395 0,5 0,406 0,375 0,392 0,492 
3 Mean 0,13 0,16 0,42 0,18 0,14 0,16 0,40 
 N 15857 15878 15299 2658 9802 4388 970 
 Standard 
deviation 
0,337 0,37 0,494 0,387 0,349 0,37 0,49 
4 Mean 0,13 0,17 0,43 0,20 0,15 0,18 0,43 
 N 17417 17406 16620 2881 10766 4598 970 
 Standard 
deviation 
0,336 0,378 0,495 0,399 0,357 0,381 0,496 
5 Mean 0,15 0,19 0,48 0,18 0,17 0,19 0,39 
 N 65981 64777 63508 11374 40303 15794 2602 
 Standard 
deviation 
0,358 0,394 0,499 0,388 0,378 0,396 0,488 
6 Mean 0,16 0,20 0,47 0,19 0,18 0,19 0,43 
 N 30976 30453 29588 4550 19347 7095 1105 
 Standard 
deviation 
0,367 0,404 0,499 0,393 0,387 0,394 0,495 
7 Mean 0,17 0,21 0,47 0,21 0,19 0,21 0,48 
 N 21875 21697 20846 2997 14173 4919 772 
 Standard 
deviation 
0,379 0,406 0,499 0,407 0,394 0,407 0,500 
8 Mean 0,19 0,23 0,51 0,23 0,21 0,23 0,52 
 N 21457 21056 20447 2893 13867 4643 729 
 Standard 
deviation 
0,390 0,419 0,500 0,420 0,404 0,423 0,500 
9 Mean 0,21 0,24 0,54 0,22 0,23 0,24 0,51 
 N 10600 10204 10149 1361 6907 2216 294 
 Standard 
deviation 
0,409 0,429 0,499 0,411 0,421 0,427 0,501 
Right Mean 0,24 0,27 0,55 0,25 0,27 0,23 0,46 
 N 22077 21068 21280 2997 13198 5053 387 
 Standard 
deviation 
0,430 0,441 0,497 0,431 0,444 0,420 0,499 
Total Mean 0,17 0,21 0,49 0,20 0,19 0,20 0,42 
 N 227296 223457 218492 35611 141381 54374 8785 
 
  
 Appendix Table 2: Margins of Error at 95% Confidence Level 
 
Sample size error margins (+-) 
for the resulting 
percentages 
error margins (+-) 
for the resulting 
percentages 
error margins (+-) 
for the resulting 
percentages 
error margins 
(+-) for the 
resulting 
percentages 
error margins 
(+-) for the 
resulting 
percentages 
N 10% or 90% 20% or 80% 30% or 70% 40% or 60% 50% 
20 13,1% 17,5% 20,1% 21,5% 21,9% 
30 10,7% 14,3% 16,4% 17,5% 17,9% 
40 9,3% 12,4% 14,2% 15,2% 15,5% 
50 8,3% 11,1% 12,7% 13,6% 13,9% 
75 6,8% 9,1% 10,4% 11,1% 11,3% 
100 5,9% 7,8% 9,0% 9,6% 9,8% 
250 3,7% 5,0% 5,7% 6,1% 6,2% 
500 2,6% 3,5% 4,0% 4,3% 4,4% 
1.000 1,9% 2,5% 2,8% 3,0% 3,1% 
2.000 1,3% 1,8% 2,0% 2,1% 2,2% 
 
 
